In the previous issue, I looked at terminology and I introduced five (or six) groups of images or metaphors that illustrate the atonement. It is now time to attempt a more thorough explanation. This is no small endeavour. Studying the atonement makes me feel like I am standing in front of a magnificent building, much larger and far more glorious than the most majestic cathedral. And now I need to describe and explain this building…
Note: this is a long issue (perhaps for the Christmas break?). One more – shorter – issue on the atonement is coming. If you want to jump ahead and read all three issues, you can DOWNLOAD THE THREE ESSAYS combined into one PDF. You can also watch this content as a VIDEO PODCAST or listen to it as an AUDIO PODCAST
But we are small-minded sinners and the atonement is great and vast. We should not expect that our theories will ever explain it fully. Even when we put them all together, we will no more than begin to comprehend a little of the vastness of God’s saving deed. (Morris 1984: 102)
Scriptural Signposts
Here is a small selection of relevant Bible passages that may function as pointers to our subject. To put it irreverently, this is the puzzle we are trying to solve. I invite you to contemplate these verses before reading any further. What do these things mean?
Behold, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world! (John 1:29)
But as it is, he has appeared once for all at the end of the ages to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself. (Heb. 9:26)
For it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins … And by that will we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all … For by a single offering he has perfected for all time those who are being sanctified. (Heb. 10:4, 10, 14)
I will strike the shepherd, and the sheep of the flock will be scattered. (Mt. 26:31)
[Christ Jesus] whom God put forward as a propitiation by his blood, to be received by faith. This was to show God’s righteousness, because in his divine forbearance he had passed over former sins. It was to show his righteousness at the present time, so that he might be just and the justifier of the one who has faith in Jesus. (Rom. 3:25f)
But God shows his love for us in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us. (Rom. 5:8)
Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us – for it is written, “Cursed is everyone who is hanged on a tree”. (Gal. 3:13)
For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received: that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures. (1 Cor. 15:3f)
In him we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, according to the riches of his grace. (Eph. 1:7)
And you, who were dead in your trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh, God made alive together with him, having forgiven us all our trespasses, by canceling the record of debt that stood against us with its legal demands. This he set aside, nailing it to the cross. He disarmed the rulers and authorities and put them to open shame, by triumphing over them in him. (Col. 2:13-15)
… knowing that you were ransomed from the futile ways inherited from your forefathers, not with perishable things such as silver or gold, but with the precious blood of Christ, like that of a lamb without blemish or spot. (1 Pet. 1:18f)
For to this you have been called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, so that you might follow in his steps. He committed no sin, neither was deceit found in his mouth. When he was reviled, he did not revile in return; when he suffered, he did not threaten, but continued entrusting himself to him who judges justly. He himself bore our sins in his body on the tree, that we might die to sin and live to righteousness. By his wounds you have been healed. (1 Pet. 2:21-24)
But he was pierced for our transgressions;
he was crushed for our iniquities;
upon him was the chastisement that brought us peace,
and with his wounds we are healed.
All we like sheep have gone astray;
we have turned – every one – to his own way;
and the LORD has laid on him
the iniquity of us all …
Yet it was the will of the LORD to crush him;
he has put him to grief;
when his soul makes an offering for guilt,
he shall see his offspring; he shall prolong his days;
the will of the LORD shall prosper in his hand.
Out of the anguish of his soul he shall see and be satisfied;
by his knowledge shall the righteous one, my servant,
make many to be accounted righteous,
and he shall bear their iniquities. (Is. 53:5f, 10f)
Models
Often, explanations are offered in the form of models. A model is a simplified description of reality. For the atonement, models are based on presumed parallels between the human world and its practices and God’s actions. In other words, they are illustrative and approximate, not exact and real equivalents; see the influential essay by J. I. Packer (2019) on penal substitution for this vital point.
It is common to put the focus on three such models: penal substitution, moral influence or example, and ransom theory or Christus Victor view. They were first distinguished in this way by Gustaf Aulén (2003) in a classic study originally published in 1931. This book is often referred to; I would be hard-pressed to come up with a book on the atonement that does not mention it.
Aulén’s book is admirably clear but it has unfortunate sides to it, with far-reaching consequences. First, he treats the three types as mutually exclusive: it is one or the other, either/or, not both/and. Second, his analysis of the church fathers and the early church is skewed and inaccurate. It has led to the myth, widespread today, that for the first one thousand years of its existence, the church held to a Christus Victor understanding. Not so; more on this when we come to the Christus Victor model.
In addition, I would argue that we need more than three ideas to do justice to the cross, more even than I can include here. I will for instance leave out René Girard’s scapegoat model, the cross as revelation, and the great reversal that turns social hierarchies upside down (Lk. 1:51-3). None of these truly explain atonement in the narrow sense of the word, but still, they indicate the atonement is big, not small; it is a palace, not a three-room apartment.
I have arranged the explanations I do cover in part chronologically and in part logically, to shape a pathway through the atonement maze that hopefully enables us not to get lost.
So infinite is the mystery of God’s saving work that we need many interpretive images, many tones, many voices (Baker and Green 2011: 139).
The Language of Sacrifice
The language of sacrifice is by far the most common way the NT speaks about the death of Christ. Whenever his blood is mentioned, which is often, the idea of sacrifice is in the background.
Sacrifice is not normally discussed as a model of the atonement, presumably because it does not explain it (or does it?). It seems to have been self-explanatory back then, which is not true today. It is therefore considered an image rather than a model or theory. Still, because of its prevalence in Scripture, sacrifice needs to be our point of departure.
The image itself is multifaceted. We have the Passover lamb, the blood of which preserved the Israelite firstborn from death. We have both the old and the new covenant initiated by blood. Jesus is explicit about this when he institutes the Lord’s supper:
And he took a cup, and when he had given thanks he gave it to them, saying, “Drink of it, all of you, for this is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins.” (Mt. 26:27f ESV)
We have the day of atonement in Leviticus 16 with its elaborate ritual. In a highly symbolic manner, it makes visible the need to remove sin and impurity. And we have different types of sacrifice described in the opening chapters of Leviticus. Some are explicitly “to make atonement”. Others have the effect of sanctifying something or someone. Yet a third group serves as a form to celebrate intimate community with God (and others) in the form of a sacrificial meal. There appears to be a sequence here, a three-step process of drawing near to God through sacrifice: remove sin and impurity, sanctify, celebrate communion.
Is it too much to recognize in this the NT theology of justification and sanctification leading to fellowship and union with God – for which the sacrificial death of Christ was essential?
The blood of Jesus, so 1 John 1:7, “cleanses us from all sin”. That is not an explanation but perhaps it communicates the truth more effectively than an explanation could.
But in the middle of [the temple system] is one great governing idea: a sacrifice is something given over into the hands of God, most dramatically when it is a life given over with the shedding of blood. That gift of life or blood somehow casts a veil over the sin or sickness or disorder of an individual or of a whole people. It removes the consequences of sin; it offers the possibility of a relationship unclouded by guilt with God; it is a gift that stands between God and failures or disorders of the world. The gift is given – and it’s a costly gift because it’s about life and blood – so that peace and communication may be re-established between heaven and earth. And this was always symbolized by the fact that the sacrificed animal would be cooked and cut up and shared in the meal, which expressed not only fellowship with one another, but restored fellowship with God. It’s a gift that in the language of the Old Testament turns away the anger and displeasure of God. In the jargon of theology it ‘propitiates’ God, it makes things all right with him again, but also it brings him back into an active relationship with the world. At the highest point, sacrifice establishes – or re-establishes, confirms – the covenant, God’s alliance with God’s people. (Williams 2017: 24f)
The Mechanism of Sacrifice
Still, we want to know more. How does sacrifice ‘work’? What is the mechanism involved? Somehow, it cleanses the worshipper from sin and impurity. It brings about expiation, to use that word again, and, depending on your views, propitiation as well.
But “somehow” is not an explanation. It begs the question: how does sacrifice do this? What does it do? Of course, the old answer is that the sacrificial animal dies in the place of the worshipper, as his substitute, taking the consequence of sin. This fits well with the penal substitution model of the atonement (for “consequences”, read punishment) – which is why it does not sit well with critics of this model.
For them, there is a new way of looking at sacrifice that emphasises life rather than death. For both views, the crucial statement occurs in the second half of Leviticus 17, where the eating of blood is prohibited:
For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it for you on the altar to make atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that makes atonement by the life. (Lev. 17:11 ESV)
Geoff Holsclaw (2019; emphasis in original) explains it like this:
Many look at Lev. 17:11 as offering blood as a symbol of life, rather than the symbol of death. The text even says as much, “the life of a creature is in the blood.” If the life is in the blood, then any offering of blood is actually an offering or releasing of life through sacrifice. In this view blood is offered as a defense against death, or to act as a ritual cleanser to wipe away the effects of sin. In this view God – who is the God of life – is offering life through the sacrificial system as a mean of overcome [sic] the death entering in through sin.
In this view – instead of substituting one death for another death – the idea of sacrifice is to exchange death for life.
The death caused by sin is counteracted by life (temporarily, through the imperfect animal sacrifices).
But to say that sacrifice is a “releasing of life” seems absurd. Life is not released but terminated. Yes, my life is released, but at the expense of another life. The net result is indeed, as McKnight claims, “to exchange death for life”, but this appears to happen through “substituting one death for another death”, not through a transfer of life from the animal to the worshiper.
Hartmut Gese, one of the originators of this newer view of sacrifice, states: “Cultic, sanctifying atonement is in no sense a negative procedure of removing sin or of penance. It is coming to God by passing through the sentence of death” (Gese 1981: 114). Indeed – but “through the sentence of death” implies punishment, which then enables the second, positive step toward reconciliation. It needs both the negative (removal of sin) and the positive (sanctification).
As pointed out in the previous section, there certainly is such a positive side to sacrifice. Depending on the type of sacrifice, it can serve to sanctify the one bringing the sacrifice, transferring the person from the profane realm to God’s sphere. Sacrifice, then, does more than deal with the consequences of sin, but it definitely does the latter.
And perhaps more importantly, it does both by means of death. The sacrifice of Christ has the same double effect, likewise by means of death (and resurrection). It cleanses/purifies and sanctifies/consecrates:
For it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins [by implication: the blood of Christ accomplishes precisely this] … And by that will we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all. (Heb. 10: 4, 10 ESV)
Paul’s language for this is that Christ died for us and that at the same time we died with Christ, thereby also sharing in his resurrection (something to which we will return).
A few more points to consider, before we move on:
- When we speak of sins in this context, it cannot refer
to the actual sinful actions. They are things of the past and cannot be
cleansed by a sacrifice or born by a substitute. “Sins” here must be a
metonymy, a related term for, in this case, the consequences of those
sins. The sins themselves cannot be taken away; but any resulting guilt,
impurity, curse, threat of punishment, and further consequences may continue to
exist until they are dealt with. - Sacrifice in the Old Testament is in many cases
substitutionary: the laying on of a hand (e.g. Lev. 1:4) indicates the animal represents
the one offering it. - It is often said that to make atonement never has God
as its object; atonement is made for sin(s) or for people. Therefore, so the
reasoning, it is about expiation, not propitiation. However, in Leviticus,
sacrifices are often said to be offerings to God. And according to
Hebrews 9:14, Jesus “offered himself without blemish to God”. - Some of the sacrifices in the law are described as a
“pleasing aroma”; this indicates they have God as their object and bring about
a change in God’s attitude because of the sacrifice; this, too, supports the
idea of propitiation.
All of this suggests that the old way of explaining the mechanism of sacrifice may have been at least substantially right after all. That said, I do not think sacrifice can be reduced to (an image of) penal substitution; that would leave too much out. The sacrifice Christ offered is not just his death but also his life, and it does not only deal with the negative but also establishes a new, positive reality (cf. Heb. 10:19-22: it cleanses not a guilty but an evil conscience).
The Great Exchange
Although it does not constitute a model of the atonement and does not provide an explanation for its workings, the motif of “the great exchange” must be mentioned here. For one, it is a beautiful summary of what the atonement accomplishes for us. And second, it is widespread in the earliest writings of the church after the NT and can be found in the NT itself as well:
For you know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sake he became poor, so that you by his poverty might become rich. (2 Cor. 8:9 ESV)
For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God. (2 Cor. 5:21 ESV)
Michael Horton (2018: i, chapter 2) considers this, and not some form of ransom theory or Christus Victor, the consensus view of the church fathers. And Oliver Crisp summarizes the writings of Irenaeus of Lyon (c. 130-c. 202) and Athanasius (c. 297-373) on the atonement with this short but powerful line: “Christ became human that we might become divine” (Crisp 2020: 47; emphasis in original). A great exchange indeed, and worth pondering.
This is the wonderful exchange which, out of his measureless benevolence, he has made with us; that, becoming Son of man with us, he has made us sons of God with him; that, by his descent to earth, he has prepared an ascent to heaven for us; that, by taking on our mortality, he has conferred his immortality upon us; that, accepting our weakness, he has strengthened us by his power; that, receiving our poverty unto himself, he has transferred his wealth to us; that, taking the weight of our iniquity upon himself (which oppressed us), he has clothed us with his righteousness. (Calvin 1960: 1362; Institutes 4.17.2)
Ransom Theory
Christ’s death is a ransom that obtains our deliverance. It is an overstatement to call this a theory; it may be better to speak of a ransom idea or image. As such, we already touched on it in the previous issue. The ransom idea is widespread in the church fathers and has clear and obvious roots in Scripture.
However, it is important to note a few points about how the church fathers write about it:
- The ransom idea is rarely developed into a fuller
explanation. - It is usually only one component of a much broader
understanding of the atonement. - There is no agreement to whom the ransom was paid –
which leaves it somewhat wanting as an explanation, let alone a theory of the
atonement.
The latter points to a crucial weakness of redemption or ransom as a full model. It hardly makes sense that God would pay himself to purchase our freedom. So, was the ransom paid to the devil? But why would the devil have any legal rights over humanity, rights of such a nature that God felt obliged to honour them? Isn’t Satan himself a lawless rebel, whose power is based on brute force and deception, not legitimate authority?
In some versions of ransom theory, the devil is tricked into a deal. He accepts Jesus in exchange for humanity, not fully recognizing that Jesus is God in human form or what this implies: he will not be able to hold Jesus captive in death, either because Jesus is without sin and therefore not liable to death or because of his divine power that overcomes death.
In other versions, Satan is not tricked but simply overreaches his authority. By killing Jesus in blind hatred, he kills an innocent victim, someone who is without sin. He has no right to do so and therefore has overstepped his boundaries, which leads to his losing control over death.
However, it seems strange that God would appoint Satan to supervise and administer the institution of death. What is more, there is no real biblical foundation for such a construct in which the devil is either misled or misjudges. There is only one verse that may be quoted in support of it, 1 Corinthians 2:8:
None of the rulers of this age understood this, for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.
However, there is no indication in the context of this verse that Paul is thinking of spiritual powers rather than human rulers. The Greek word used here (archon) is never used of non-human forces in the NT. The only exception, always in the singular, is its use for either Satan or Beelzebul as the prince or ruler of demons (e.g. Mt. 12:24) or of this world (e.g. John 12:31). Demonic powers themselves are never referred to with this word.
Normally, the word refers to various human authorities. This makes sense in the context of 1 Corinthians 2. Jesus was condemned to death by human authorities: “Our chief priests and rulers delivered him up to be condemned to death, and crucified him” (Lk. 24:20).
Besides, there is no indication that Adam formally relinquished or lost dominion over creation to the devil. Through disobedience he removed himself from God’s protection. Thus, the devil could overwhelm him. But this is usurped authority; there is nothing legitimate about it. Satan is a worse transgressor and offender than humanity.
There is one more option. Was the ransom paid to death? After all, God had said that Adam would die if he ate of the forbidden tree. One could take this as a commitment from God’s side. As a result, something is owed to death. However, even though death is sometimes personified and spoken about in personal terms, it is an abstract concept. God does not owe a debt to death, as if he made a promise or entered into a contractual relationship with death.
It seems better to understand terms like to redeem or to ransom as metaphors meaning to liberate or to release. There is a cost (Christ has to die), but no payment (in the sense of a transaction with a recipient). But if redemption is not a model but an image only, it fails to offer a full explanation.
Anselm’s Satisfaction Model
Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1033-1109) is arguably the most important voice on the meaning of the atonement between Augustine and Luther. Interestingly, hardly anyone holds his view today, but virtually everyone who writes about the atonement at any length discusses his views – and that more than 900 years after his death.
The reason is that Anselm’s book on the subject turned out to be a milestone in thinking about the atonement. Except for On the Incarnation by Athanasius (written before 319), it is perhaps the first thorough and focused systematic treatment of the subject. Its title is Cur Deus Homo, literally meaning “Why a God-man” or “Why God became man”. Why did the atonement require someone who was both God and man?
In his answer, Anselm persuasively rejected any ransom offered to the devil. Instead, something had to be offered to God to make up for the offence against his divine honour (therefore “satisfaction”).
Anselm did not believe that God needed this, since God does not need anything. But justice had to be satisfied and the order of the universe had to be restored, either through punishment of the offenders or through appropriate satisfaction or – to use a more modern word –compensation. Christ did the latter by offering to God a gift as a satisfaction: his selfless death.
Since God is infinite, the offence is infinite and requires a gift of infinite worth to make up for it. No ordinary human could accomplish this, but the divine son born as a human could. He could represent us because he is human, and he could bring infinite satisfaction because he is himself infinite.
All of this is magnificently coherent and logical. I only see one weak spot. It fails to explain why the voluntary death of Jesus was such a wonderful gift and an expression of love, pleasing the Father beyond measure, if it did not actually ‘do’ something; what kind of a gift is this? What compensatory value does it have?
At any rate, according to Anselm, Christ offered compensation to satisfy the demands of justice. This is different from penal substitution. He did not bear our punishment. However, both views agree on the central importance of justice being satisfied. Anselm thus paved the way for the hegemony of penal substitution that followed the Reformation.
Moral Influence and Example
Obviously, what Christ did both in life and in death functions as an example and is meant to influence how we live; on this, all the models agree. The moral influence model, usually traced back to Peter Abelard (c. 1079-1142), argues that this is the essence of the atonement:
Abelard’s primary answer to the atonement question came in the form of a third broad paradigm: The work of Christ chiefly consists of demonstrating to the world the amazing depth of God’s love for sinful humanity. The atonement was directed primarily at humanity, not God. There is nothing inherent in God that must be appeased before he is willing to forgive sinful humanity. The problem rather lies in the sinful, hardened human heart, with its fear and ignorance of God. Humanity refuses to turn to God and be reconciled. Through the incarnation and death of Jesus Christ, the love of God shines like a beacon, beckoning humanity to come and fellowship. (Eddy and Beilby 2006: 19)
Abelard has often been misrepresented in this regard. His understanding was broader and certainly not limited to such an exemplarist or moral influence model (Johnson 2017). It became especially important in the 19th century and beyond in liberal theology.
Example or influence? This is more than a difference in names.
If Christ’s death is merely taken as an example (that is, it does not actually ‘do’ or change anything directly), it becomes an impossible burden: how could we possibly live up to this standard? There is no atonement in this.
If Christ’s death is understood as an influence, it could be taken to effect atonement in the sense of reconciliation by overcoming human animosity against God by God showing his love for us. But there is no atonement in the sense of expiation (of sin) or propitiation (of God’s wrath) involved. And it might be questioned in that case how Christ’s dying for us expresses God’s love. Why did Jesus have to die? What does it do? How is it love? How did he die for us? Perhaps by demonstrating that even the crucifixion will not keep God from loving us, but that is a weak explanation of atonement.
Again, the cross certainly (also) demonstrates the extent of God’s love. But as a stand-alone explanation of the atonement moral influence fails to account for it.
Penal Substitution
Penal substitution (except in quotations, I will use the abbreviation PS in this section) is perhaps so well known that it does not need an explanation. I will give one anyway:
Penal substitutionary atonement assumes the logic of the law court. Sin is understood as law-breaking, and so necessarily attracts a penalty, which is inevitably death. In dying on the cross, Jesus pays the penalty of death for all those who are saved, and so they are freed from the deserved punishment. God’s justice is satisfied by Jesus’s death. (Holmes 2017: 295)
Although traces of this view can be found from early on, it received its full and systematic formulation during the Reformation. It became the dominant explanation among Protestants and evangelicals. However, it has come under pressure: “In recent times no doctrine of the atonement has been so maligned as penal substitution” (Crisp 2020: 96). For this reason, rather than give further explanation, I will focus on criticism and questions surrounding the concept. Is the idea really that bad? I will cover 14 objections, starting with some of the weaker ones.
1. PS is divine child abuse and promotes violence. God is angry because of our sin and punishes his son instead of us. Thus, the cross is divine violence. As such, it validates human violence. It is right to punish! In addition, if the Son’s submission to suffering and punishment is laudable, then so is human submission, not least of all that of children and women to their male abusers:
If the best person who ever lived gave his life thus, then, to be of value we should likewise sacrifice ourselves … Divine child abuse is paraded as salvific and the child who suffers “without even raising a voice” is lauded as the hope of the world. (Brown and Parker 1989: 104)
Presumably because it is provocative and graphic, the charge of divine child abuse is repeated ad nauseam in literature on the atonement (e.g. Eddy and Beilby 2006: 9f; Weaver 2011: 5; Horton 2018: II, 201; Crisp 2020: 7). There is a triple irony here:
- As pointed out by Williams (2007: 83f), this is not an
argument against PS only, but against every view endorsing that Christ suffered
according to the purpose of the Father. Christus Victor views fare no better by
this standard. - God perpetrates none of the violence. God is not the
judge who pronounces the verdict. He is not the one who orders the execution.
The nails are hammered in by a soldier acting on the command of another ruler. - Greg Boyd’s version of Christus Victor (2006), which
is supportive of the criticism, puts such a strong emphasis on God’s warfare
against evil that it looks more prone to support violence than a model based on
punishment. Don’t get me wrong. No such tendency shows in Boyd. But then,
neither did J. I. Packer and Leon Morris, two of the most able defenders of PS,
beat their wives and oppress their children, as far as I
know. The issue is the potential for violence of a model or theory. “God at
War” (Boyd 1997) sounds potentially a lot more violent than “the punishment
that brought us peace was upon him”.
Still, it is possible to abuse the cross as a tool of subjugation that tells victims they need to follow Christ’s example and quietly submit to their suffering. PS can be used to justify unjust use of force or authoritarian structures, whether in the family or in society. The remedy for this is not to discard a cross-based atonement but to counter the abuse: woe to those who turn the cross into an instrument of oppression!
2. PS divides and disunites the Trinity. Is there a tension in God, between the Son and the Father, or between his wrath and his mercy? If the Son is trying to overcome the Father’s anger, however just, are they therefore working in opposite directions?
By no means. They planned this together, in full agreement. Neither the Son nor the Father is a reluctant partner. According to John 3:16, “God so loved the world, that he gave his only Son”. That Christ “gave himself for our sins” was “according to the will of our God and Father” (Gal. 1:4). If there is a tension, it is between his mercy and his justice, but not between Father and Son.
Bernard [of Clairvaux] saw the cross as reconciling the tension between God’s mercy and his truth and justice. Truthfulness requires that we die, mercy that we rise again … When Christ took our punishment upon himself, justice and peace kissed one another … The classic text here is Psalm 85:10 (which speaks of mercy and truth meeting, justice and peace kissing), which is much cited by Bernard (Lane 2008: 259)
3. The God of PS is an angry God. This criticism deserves to be taken seriously, not because it is true, but because it is a widespread perception. It has something to do with our communication as Christians. PS claims like “God is personally angry at sin” (Schreiner 2006: 77) may serve to confirm the caricature.
An angry God punishing people – it may be a distortion, but because it is widespread, proponents of PS need to work hard and find better ways to communicate the atonement.
What won’t work is to remove wrath as a category that applies to God. That way, we end up with the God of moralistic therapeutic deism (the phrase coined by Smith and Denton 2005 to describe the faith of American teenagers) – a feel-good religion in which the cross is little more than a piece of comforting jewellery we wear around our necks.
It is important to make this point. Opponents of PS often complain about how it leads to a distorted picture of an angry and violent God. But there is an opposite picture of a wrathless God that is no less distorted. The study of Smith and Denton proves that it is spreading.
4. How can God be angry if he is love? Well, how can he not be? What kind of love can remain impassive in the face of destructive evil? Precisely because God is love, he cannot be indifferent.
But of course, we need to tread carefully here. Human anger is a very imperfect parallel to divine wrath. Human anger is usually out of control and often unreasonable. God’s wrath, on the other hand, is “the reaction of holy love to that which spoils … how holiness expresses itself when meeting sin” (Cole 2017: 490). Notice how Paul sees no problem in God’s love saving us from his own wrath, meaning that in God, love and wrath are not in tension with each other:
But God shows his love for us in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us. Since, therefore, we have now been justified by his blood, much more shall we be saved by him from the wrath of God. (Rom. 5:8f ESV)
5. PS has no place for the life and resurrection of Jesus; all that matters is the cross. This may be an issue of perception. If a proponent of PS writes about the meaning of Christ’s death on the cross, he may naturally say little about Christ’s life and resurrection. A fuller treatment of the atonement is aware of the importance of his life (e.g. it establishes positive righteousness) and his resurrection (he was “raised for our justification”, Rom. 4:25). I will have more to say on this in the section on recapitulation and union.
The fact is, salvation entails much more than atonement in a narrow sense (although atonement is essential for salvation), and Christ’s death on the cross accomplishes more than atonement only. That does not mean it is illegitimate to limit a discussion to, say, the penal significance of Christ’s atoning death.
6. PS is a new idea (relatively speaking); the church fathers held to a Christus Victor understanding of the atonement. I will deal with the second part of this claim when I discuss Christus Victor. As for the first part, this is true of PS as a systematic statement. But then, apart from Anselm, hardly anyone had attempted a systematic explanation of the atonement. To speak of the satisfaction of God’s justice rather than the satisfaction of his honour looks like a step forward, to – arguably – a better explanation of the mechanism of atonement. And as mentioned above, there are pointers to a penal view earlier on; see the long quote from Cyril of Alexandria (c. 376-444) for an example.
For if we examine as well as we may the real character of the mystery of His work, we shall see that He died, not merely for Himself, nor even especially for His own sake; but that it was on behalf of humanity that He suffered and carried out both the suffering in itself and the resurrection that followed. For in that He died according to the flesh, He offered up His own life as an equivalent for the life of all; and by rendering perfect satisfaction for all, He fulfilled in Himself to the uttermost the force of that ancient curse. And in that He has risen again from the dead to a life imperishable and unceasing, in Himself He raises the whole of nature. (Cyril of Alexandria 1885a: 210; Commentary on John IX; emphasis added)
They lead away, then, to death the Author of Life; and for our sakes was this done, for by the power and incomprehensible Providence of God, Christ’s death resulted in an unexpected reversal of things. For His suffering was prepared as a snare for the power of death, and the death of the Lord was the source of the renewal of mankind in incorruption and newness of life. Bearing the Cross upon His shoulders, on which He was about to be crucified, He went forth; His doom was already fixed, and He had undergone, for our sakes, though innocent, the sentence of death. For, in His own Person, He bore the sentence righteously pronounced against sinners by the Law. For He became a curse for us, according to the Scripture: For cursed is everyone, it is said, that hangeth on a tree. And accursed are we all, for we are not able to fulfil the Law of God: For in many things we all stumble; and very prone to sin is the nature of man. And since, too, the Law of God says: Cursed is he which continueth not in all things that are written in the book of this Law, to do them, the curse, then, belongeth unto us, and not to others. For those against whom the transgression of the Law may be charged, and who are very prone to err from its commandments, surely deserve chastisement. Therefore, He That knew no sin was accursed for our sakes, that He might deliver us from the old curse. For all-sufficient was the God Who is above all, so dying for all; and by the death of His own Body, purchasing the redemption of all mankind.
The Cross, then, that Christ bore, was not for His own deserts, but was the cross that awaited us, and was our due, through our condemnation by the Law. For as He was numbered among the dead, not for Himself, but for our sakes, that we might find in Him, the Author of everlasting life, subduing of Himself the power of death; so also, He took upon Himself the Cross that was our due, passing on Himself the condemnation of the Law, that the mouth of all lawlessness might henceforth be stopped, according to the saying of the Psalmist; the Sinless having suffered condemnation for the sin of all. (Cyril of Alexandria 1885b: 623f; Commentary on John XII; cursive font in original; Cyril expresses a broad understanding of the atonement, with multiple facets, but it includes the idea of Christ taking our place and the consequence of our sin)
7. In the NT, the cross is never explained in terms of punishment. In fact, Paul’s densest statement of the atonement, in Romans 3:21-26, refers neither to punishment nor to wrath. Christ’s death was not meant to deal with wrath or judgment and therefore is not penal: Paul does not speak of Christ bearing our punishment for us.
This is an important argument in a well-written and thoughtful book, already cited several times, by Mark Baker and Joel Green, Recovering the Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in New Testament and Contemporary Contexts (2011). However, from the start, it leaves me with the impression that one of its main aims is to persuade people away from the penal substitution view, and not always in a straightforward manner.
Of course, the word wrath is used extensively in the preceding two chapters of Romans, and Baker and Green are aware of it. The authors focus on Romans 1, where the revelation of God’s wrath is a present, not a future phenomenon (73, 77-83, a rather long section). But they say hardly anything about Romans 2 and the fact that wrath also has a future, eschatological side. This is acknowledged in the text, but nothing is made of it. They also ignore that chapter 1 finishes with “God’s righteous decree that those who practice such things deserve to die” (Rom. 1:32), which sounds like punishment.
In Romans 2 and 3, the future side of wrath and judgment takes central stage. Clearly and explicitly, judgment is coming, and at this point of the argument in Romans, Romans 3:20, all humans remain without any hope to be acquitted in this future judgment. What is needed is a way to prevent the assured verdict of condemnation that awaits the unrighteous and the ungodly in the day of judgment. Romans 3:21-26 reveals this way.
Surely then, even if this passage does not use words like punishment, wrath, or judgment, it nevertheless presents how God saves us from them. After all, Paul just spent two chapters painting the background of wrath and judgment; there is no need to repeat this now.
Punishment is indeed a rare word in the NT and not used in connection with the cross. However, the cross is connected with the curse: “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us – for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone who is hanged on a tree’” (Gal. 3:13 ESV). This “curse of the law” is the legal consequence of breaking the covenant – an idea close to that of punishment.
Arguably, the biblical practice of sacrifice points in the same direction. PS offers a straightforward explanation of what sacrifice stands for: the giving of a life, executing a death sentence. If this is not the meaning of sacrifice, it remains unclear how blood can expiate (remove) sin or propitiate God’s righteous wrath at sin.
8. PS is based on modern concepts of legal justice and the law court, which is quite different from legal systems in the biblical world. This argument is important to Baker and Green (2011: 120f; it also appears in their critique of Charles Hodge in chapter 6, 166-91). In the Bible, we are not dealing with the Western concept of impersonal criminal justice.
This is true. But covenants and more relational justice systems also know punishment, including the option of a death sentence and exile when the covenant is broken. The language of “curse” fits right in.
The objection does not disprove PS, but establishes the need to formulate appropriately – as in this quote, which also appears in Baker and Green: “The shed blood is a sign that God has proved his covenant faithfulness precisely by undergoing the sanctions, legal and relational, for covenant disobedience” (Vanhoozer 2004: 398, quoted in Baker and Green 2011: 186f; emphasis original).
9. Could God have chosen to simply forgive sin, without the need for any substitutionary punishment? Does he really have to punish sin? In the human world, we know the practice of pardon, in which a criminal is released without serving his punishment. Could God have extended a general pardon to all who would repent and turn to him, thus sparing his son the ordeal of the cross? If not, it appears to limit God: he is not free but is under obligation to punish.
I find this a difficult question and it has been controversially debated almost from the beginning. It won’t do to point to the many occasions where God does indeed forgive sinners in the Bible. He may have been doing this in anticipation of dealing with the debt of punishment later, as Romans 3:25f seems to imply (“he had passed over former sins”, but only “to show his righteousness at the present time”, through Christ paying the penalty on the cross). The same self-revelation of God that claims he is “slow to anger” and forgives iniquity also includes that he “will not leave unpunished” (so literally Ex. 34:6f). There is an obvious tension here. Is the cross the only way it could have been relieved? Opinions differ.
I do see some difficulties with the idea that God could ‘just as well’ forgive without propitiation or satisfaction.
- Is the widespread human intuition that criminals
should pay for what they have done wrong? Hebrews does not consider retribution
unjust: “every transgression or disobedience received a just retribution” (Heb.
2:2). - To forgive and to pardon are not the same thing.
Forgiveness is personal and private; it is entirely my decision if I want to
forgive a debt, of whatever kind, that someone owes me. Pardon is public and
formal; it is an act performed by rulers. Therefore: - It is not only a question of what God requires (or
desires) for his own sake; the issues are public, not private, and at stake is
also what the universe as God’s creation needs. Even if God would not need retribution,
what about others? What about the victims of transgression or injustice? Is it
fair to let the perpetrators off the hook? - To put this differently, God “must be just in
justifying” (Davidson 2017: 52). The shocking paradox of Romans is that God
justifies the ungodly (Rom. 4:5). How can this be just? “What the doctrine of
the atonement attempts haltingly to articulate is the equal ultimacy of God’s
love and God’s light (justice, holiness). On the cross neither mercy nor
justice loses out” (Vanhoozer 2004: 403). It is not certain that God could have
done this without the cross. - A free pardon might make sin look cheap. And it might
make God’s love less obvious. The way of the cross means it cost him dearly.
Since God chose it, I think we can assume it was the best way possible. - Maybe we need PS, so we can accept his shocking
generosity. How would we know that the offered pardon is genuine? When God
pre-emptively payed the penalty for our sin, he sent a strong sign that he is
serious. - Maybe we (or at least some of us) need it for a
different reason as well. If God simply forgave us without further ado, would
we be able to believe that guilt had been removed? Would we be able to overcome
our sense of shame in his presence? - Any sensible pardon assumes repentance; it is not a
general pardon without any strings attached. Such a free-for-all is likely to
leave everything unchanged – or make things worse. Maybe even Satan would avail
himself of that kind of a pardon?
However, if repentance and life change are a condition, who will succeed? Israel’s repentance in the OT never lasted long; why would we fare any better? Simple forgiveness alone would not have solved this. Admittedly, PS is not a full solution either. An important piece is still missing.
10. It does not make sense to both punish and forgive. If sin can be forgiven, there is no need to punish; if sin is punished, there is no need for forgiveness. Or is there? Some things to consider:
- It may be that substitutionary punishment is the very
means or mechanism of forgiveness: God forgives through (by means of) PS.
Perhaps Colossians 2:13f points in this direction: God has “forgiven us all our
trespasses, by canceling the record of debt … nailing it to the cross”. It
certainly sounds like a similar apparent contradiction. - In our modern system of justice, punishment and
forgiveness are unrelated. Victims of a crime may forgive the perpetrator; the
judge will still condemn and punish that person. Even though things were
different in biblical times, this fact proves the claim above is not a
universal truth. - Punishment does not take care of all the consequences
of a crime. The criminal who is released after having served his term is not in
every sense of the word restored – far from it! Forgiveness may be understood
as personal and relational; if so, it goes beyond the status of ‘punishment
completed’, dues paid. - However, Craig (2020: 242-64, chapter 12) makes a
strong case that divine forgiveness should be understood as a formal pardon,
not as a parallel to personal, individual forgiveness, which is a private
affair. God offers us a full pardon. But God is perfectly just. Can a pardon be
just?
Since God is both the judge and the ruler with the power of pardon, he faces the dilemma of the righteous judge: how to be both just and merciful. PS is the solution. What forgiveness means, then, is that God does not let go of exacting punishment, but lets go of exacting punishment from us. Forgiveness and punishment are therefore not contradictory in this case.
11. How can one man’s death pay for the sins and debts of everyone? One possible answer is: because he is also divine and therefore infinite. Any man, anyone else would not have sufficed; only the God-man, being infinite, would do.
Imagine scales. On one side, all humans are piled up, everyone who ever lived and everyone who will yet live. On the other side is Christ. Will this suffice? The answer is yes. Because he is also God; being infinite, he outweighs the totality of finite humanity.
12. It is not possible to transfer sin or guilt. Financial debt can be paid by someone else, but this is not possible for judicial punishment. Another person cannot go to prison for me.
However, just because “doing time” or otherwise taking upon oneself guilt or legal punishment for someone else is not an option in our criminal justice system does not mean it is fundamentally impossible. And even in our system, someone else may pay a fine for me. A fine is meant as a punishment; yet, the punishment is not upon me. This is a form of PS.
What is transferred in such cases is not necessarily sin or guilt; it could also be the liability for punishment or, as Crisp (2020: 97) puts it, the “penal consequences” of sin.
In other words, God “inflicted upon Christ the suffering which we deserved as the punishment for our sins, as a result of which we no longer deserve punishment. Notice that this explication leaves open the question whether Christ was punished for our sins” (Craig 2020: 168). The latter is widely denied by proponents of PS:
On such an understanding, God afflicted Christ with the suffering which, had it been inflicted upon us, would have been our just desert and, hence, punishment. In other words, Christ was not punished, but he endured the suffering which would have been our punishment had it been inflicted on us. (Ibid.: 169)
Fact is, the NT does speak of Christ dying or giving himself for our sin(s) (1 Cor. 15:3; John 1:29; Gal. 1:4; Heb. 5:1, 3; 9:28; 1 Pet. 2:24; 3:18). PS offers the most straightforward explanation for what this means.
13. PS is unjust. It cannot be right to punish someone who is innocent.
In most cases, this is of course true. But if the substitute genuinely, freely, volunteers? The condition is virtually impossible to guarantee in normal human affairs – a good reason not to allow such a praxis in our justice system. But why would it always be wrong? The question is rarely asked, let alone answered. As Craig (2020: 197f) points out,
The objection, then, is the familiar Socinian objection that it would be unjust of God to punish Christ, an innocent person, in our place. Detractors of penal substitution who press this objection almost never develop it in any depth … There is nothing here to interact with apart from the single question: How is justice served by punishing a completely innocent person? We need to go deeper.
In the pages that follow, Craig (ibid.: 198ff) refutes the objection. Of course, for those proponents of PS who believe Christ was not punished (but only suffered in our stead; see the previous point), the objection makes no sense. But even those who believe Christ was punished for our sins are not refuted by the ‘injustice’ argument. If we accept that our sins were imputed to Christ, he would not be innocent: he would be legally liable for those sins. The objection would not hold. But this leads to another objection.
14. Imputation is a legal fiction. The objection follows from the previous point. My sin is imputed to Christ; he is now legally liable to punishment. God pretends and counts Christ’s suffering as my punishment (and, in Reformed theology, his righteousness as my righteousness). But everyone can see that this is, in reality, untrue.
Let’s assume for a moment that we are indeed dealing with legal fiction. Why would this be bad? Whenever the objection is raised, it comes with a negative, even derogatory connotation. But is this justified?
In judicial matters, legal fiction is a most useful tool. Companies, associations, and other human institutions can be counted as “legal persons”. No one believes IBM or the national branch of the Red Cross is a real person. The fiction enables legal ownership and contractual obligations; it is most useful. Adoption is a legal fiction as well (of parenthood). Come to think of it: What do you think your nationality is? It is a fiction, not a real thing; you can even change it. But its consequences are real. And that is the crucial point: the consequences and results of something based on a legal fiction are concrete and real, and not at all fictional.
Craig’s defence of legal fiction (2018b; 2020: chapter 10, 197ff) is well worth reading. Theologians who are up in arms against the use of legal fiction in explanations of the atonement show all the signs of not knowing what they are talking about. Merely claiming that the atonement (or PS) is a legal fiction does not disprove it.
Besides, our relation to Christ (and his relationship with humanity) is more than merely formal and legal. He truly became one of us; his substitution and representation of us are not fictional. In the final section on union and recapitulation, I will come back to this.
To summarize: It appears PS is a valid way to speak of the atonement, helpful to understand what it involves – but it is incomplete. Legal systems and concepts of legal justice stop being helpful at some point; PS is, after all, a model, not an exact parallel. PS needs to be embedded in other biblical images and concepts (first and foremost that of sacrifice), so I continue my quest: are there more facets that need to be considered?
Illustrations
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Book Recommendation
Craig, William Lane. 2020. Atonement and the Death of Christ: An Exegetical, Historical, and Philosophical Exploration (Waco: Baylor University Press)
Crisp, Oliver. 2020. Approaching the Atonement: The Reconciling Work of Christ (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press)
Williams, Rowan. 2017. God With Us: The Meaning Of The Cross And Resurrection – Then And Now (London: SPCK)
References
Titles listed below include references for all three parts of this series. Unless indicated differently, all Bible quotations from: The Holy Bible: English Standard Version. 2001 (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Bibles)
Athanasius. 1903. On the Incarnation of the Word of God, 2nd edn, trans. by T. Herbert Bindley (London: Religious Tract Society)
Aulén, Gustaf, and A. G. Herbert. 2003. Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock)
Baker, Mark D., and Joel B. Green. 2011. Recovering the Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in New Testament and Contemporary Contexts, 2nd ed (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic)
Barrett, Charles K. 1957. A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (London: Black)
Beasley-Murray, Paul. 2002. Fearless for Truth (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster)
Beilby, James K., and Paul R. Eddy (eds.). 2006. The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic)
Boyd, Gregory A. 1997. God at War: The Bible & Spiritual Conflict (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press)
———. 2006. ‘Christus Victor View’, in The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views, ed. by James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic), pp. 23-65
Brown, Joanne Carlson, and Rebecca Parker. 1989. ‘Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse: A Feminist Critique’, in For God So Loved the World?, ed. by Joanne Carlson Brown and Carole R. Bohn (New York: Pilgrim Press), pp. 103-26
Calvin, Jean. 1960. Institutes of the Christian Religion, The Library of Christian Classics, 20-21, 2 vols, ed. by John T McNeill, trans. by Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press)
Cole, Graham A. 2017. ‘Expiation/Propitiation’, in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, Bloomsbury Companions, 5 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark), pp. 403-5
Craig, William Lane. 2018a. The Atonement, Cambridge Elements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
———. 2018b. ‘Is Penal Substitution Unjust?’ <http://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/christian-doctrines/is-penal-substitution-unjust/> [accessed 24 July 2020]
———. 2020. Atonement and the Death of Christ: An Exegetical, Historical, and Philosophical Exploration (Waco: Baylor University Press)
Crisp, Oliver. 2020. Approaching the Atonement: The Reconciling Work of Christ (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press)
Cyril of Alexandria. 1885a. Commentary on the Gospel According to S. John, II S. John IX-XXI, A Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, trans. by Thomas Randell (London: Walter Smith) <http://tertullian.org/fathers/cyril_on_john_09_book9.htm> [accessed 15 June 2020]
———. 1885b. Commentary on the Gospel According to S. John, II S. John IX-XXI, A Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, trans. by Thomas Randell (London: Walter Smith) <http://tertullian.org/fathers/cyril_on_john_12_book12.htm> [accessed 15 June 2020]
Davidson, Ivor J. 2017. ‘Atonement and Incarnation’, in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, Bloomsbury Companions, 5 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark), pp. 35-56
Eddy, Paul R., and James K. Beilby. 2006. ‘The Atonement: An Introduction’, in The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views, ed. by James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic), pp. 9-21
Garcia, Mark A. 2017. ‘Union with Christ’, in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, Bloomsbury Companions, 5 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark), pp. 781-86
Gese, Hartmut. 1981. Essays on Biblical Theology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House)
Green, Joel B. 2006. ‘Kaleidoscopic View’, in The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views, ed. by James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, Ill: IVP Academic), pp. 157-85
Johnson, Adam J. (ed.). 2017. T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, Bloomsbury Companions, 5 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark)
Holmes, Stephen R. 2008. ‘Ransomed, Healed, Restored, Forgiven Evangelical Accounts of the Atonement’, in The Atonement Debate: Papers from the London Symposium on the Theology of Atonement, ed. by Steve Chalke, Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan), pp. 267-291
———. 2017. ‘Penal Substitution’, in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, Bloomsbury Companions, 5 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark), pp. 295-314
Holsclaw , Geoff. 2019. ‘The Shedding of Blood and Christian Faith’, Jesus Creed <https://www.patheos.com/blogs/jesuscreed/2019/04/08/the-shedding-of-blood-and-christian-faith/> [accessed 30 June 2020]
Horton, Michael Scott. 2018. Justification, New Studies in Dogmatics, 2 vols (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan)
Johnson, Adam J. 2017. ‘Peter Abelard’, in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, Bloomsbury Companions, 5 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark), pp. 357-60
Kolb, Robert A. 2017. ‘Martin Luther’, in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, Bloomsbury Companions, 5 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark), pp. 613-21
Lane, Tony. 2008. ‘Bernard of Clairvaux: Theologian of the Cross’, in The Atonement Debate: Papers from the London Symposium on the Theology of Atonement, ed. by Steve Chalke, Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan), pp. 249-66
McGuckin, John A. 2017. ‘St. Gregory of Nyssa on the Dynamics of Salvation’, in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, Bloomsbury Companions, 5 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark), pp. 155-73
Morris, Leon. 1983. The Atonement, Its Meaning and Significance (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press)
———. 1984. ‘Atonement, Theories Of’, in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, ed. by Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House), pp. 100-102
Motyer, Steve. 2008. ‘The Atonement in Hebrews’, in The Atonement Debate: Papers from the London Symposium on the Theology of Atonement, ed. by Steve Chalke, Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan), pp. 136-51
Murray, John. 2015. Redemption Accomplished and Applied (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing)
Packer, J. I. 2019. ‘What Did the Cross Achieve? The Logic of Penal Substitution’, 9Marks Journal, August: 8-56
Rogers, Jr., Eugene F. 2017. ‘Blood’, in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, Bloomsbury Companions, 5 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark), pp. 403-5
‘Satisfaction Theory of Atonement’. 2020. Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Satisfaction_theory_of_atonement&oldid=963589879> [accessed 30 June 2020]
Silva, Moisés (ed.). 2014. New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology and Exegesis, Second edition, 5 vols (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan)
Smith, Christian, and Melinda Lundquist Denton. 2005. Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press)
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Van den Brink, Gerd. 2017. ‘Hugo Grotius’, in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, Bloomsbury Companions, 5 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark), pp. 523-6
Vanhoozer, Kevin. 2004. ‘The Atonement in Post-Modernity: Guilt, Goats and Gifts’, in The Glory of the Atonement Biblical, Historical and Practical Perspectives; Essays in Honor of Roger Nicole, ed. by Charles E. Hill and Frank A. James III (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press), pp. 367-404
Williams, Gary J. 2007. ‘Penal Substitution: A Response to Recent Criticisms’, Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, 50.1: 71-86
Williams, Rowan. 2017. God With Us: The Meaning Of The Cross And Resurrection – Then And Now (London: SPCK)